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I. Introduction 
  Drought concerns us when it compromises the long-term productivity and welfare of 
households. The same drought event, however, can affect households differently due to 
differences in portfolios of income-generating activities. A household’s response to a shock is a 
function of its unique, idiosyncratic income shock, but also of its relative costs of various coping 
strategies. For a household that has already drawn down a productive asset to critical levels, 
selling one more unit could come at a high cost in terms of future productivity. Likewise, a 
household consuming the bare minimum would be loath to further sacrifice consumption. How a 
household responds to income shocks is therefore also a function of the composition and levels 
of its assets. The same outward response has different consequences in terms of consumption, 
and long-term productivity. This paper presents a model of asset re-allocation in response to 
drought in which a) each household’s idiosyncratic characteristics temper the income shock that 
it receives and b) a household’s coping response is also a function of its asset endowment. It then 
applies this model to coping responses observed over a cross section of rural Moroccan 
households after a drought event. We demonstrate the utility of such as model in characterizing 
households that are particularly vulnerable to drought, and in identifying interventions.  
II. Drought and vulnerability 
  The presence of drought affects households through two principal pathways. The first and 
obvious pathway is that of periodically subjecting households to periods of income deficit. 
Income deficits force households to choose between present and future consumption. The second 
pathway is through the households’ anticipation of drought. High uncertainty in the weather 
could force some households to choose income sources that provide more stable, but less 
remunerative income streams, especially if those households have already drawn down their 
assets to critical levels. If drought forces a household to dip into its productive asset base or to 
make more conservative income choices, it compromises the household’s future productivity. 
With low productivity, households have fewer assets and therefore a lower tolerance for income 
variability. The combination of the two effects can entrap some households in poverty. 
  Income deficits force households to sacrifice assets and consumption. If a household 
rations consumption, it may do so in order to avoid destabilizing productive assets. If a 
household draws down its asset base, it does so presumably for the purpose of protecting 
consumption. A large literature tests for this latter consumption-smoothing behavior. This 
literature is based predominantly on data from multi-year studies from south India, Zimbabwe, 
and Burkina Faso, where households rely primarily on agricultural income that is highly variable   3
due uncertainty in the timing and quantity of rainfall. The general consensus is that consumption 
smoothing does take place to a limited extent, and that it is more prevalent among wealthier 
households (Kazianga and Udry, 2006; Morduch, 1995).  
  For households with few assets, further destabilization of those assets could come at a 
high price. In a review of studies of famine events in sub-Saharan Africa, Corbett (1988) notes 
that households first responded to income deficits by reducing consumption and disposing buffer 
assets. Only when such ‘lower-cost’ responses had been exhausted, or the cost of malnutrition 
became too high, did households sell productive assets. In a theoretical study of asset-smoothing 
behavior, Zimmerman and Carter (2003) use a simulation to show that poor agents will smooth 
assets rather than consumption when faced with a subsistence constraint and asset price risk. 
However, as Hoddinott (2006) points out, the distinction between asset smoothing and 
consumption smoothing is somewhat artificial and not altogether useful. He summarizes, 
“...household responses to adverse shocks are effectively changes in their asset portfolio, with a 
critical issue being the extent to which the draw down of a given asset has permanent 
consequences.” 
  Not only do households differ in their response to drought, they also prepare for it 
differently. We expect that households in riskier environments and/or those in precarious asset 
situations would choose their income activities in a way that protects the income stream from the 
vagaries of the weather. Such households can favor variability-reducing input and production 
techniques (e.g. field scattering as observed by Carter (1997)), postpone investments or planting 
until more uncertainty is resolved, and/or engage in off-farm work (Morduch, 1995). Work by 
Zimmerman and Carter (2003) suggests that asset price risk combined with subsistence 
constraints will induce poor households to adopt conservative portfolios. Dercon and 
Christiaensen’s (2007) empirical study concludes that households apply insufficient levels of 
fertilizer as a result of the associated downside income risk. Conversely, we expect households 
that can protect consumption without endangering their production base (due to large asset 
endowments, insurance, credit, or borrowing) to allocate assets among activities that maximize 
expected income. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that households exposed to greater 
weather risk put their wealth into lower risk portfolios, but that this relationship is attenuated by 
wealth. That is, wealthier households are less concerned with smoothing income since they are 
more willing (lower risk aversion) and/or better positioned to deal with income shocks (wealth 
helps households to smooth consumption). In short, those households that smooth income may   4
be those with little ability to buffer consumption and are close to a critical asset threshold below 
which leads to destitution. 
  Reduced income variability may come at the cost of profitability and consequently 
compromise long-term growth. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that low-variability 
asset portfolios are less remunerative. Dercon and Christiaensen (2007) observe that insufficient 
fertilizer application due to downside risk aversion results in lower average crop productivity. 
Lower productivity keeps asset levels low; low asset levels may limit households’ choices to 
low-risk/low-return income-generating activities, thus trapping some households in poverty. The 
same cycle can be initiated when households sacrifice productive assets after drought events, 
thereby reducing productivity.
1  
  Wealth and assets play a large role in determining which households are permanently 
hurt by drought and which are not. Zimmerman and Carter’s (2003) dynamic simulation model 
with subsistence constraints illustrates how initially wealthier households become wealthier by 
pursuing a strategy of high-risk/high investments, and initially poorer households, forced to 
smooth income, become even poorer. Lybbert et al. (2004) identify a threshold level of livestock 
holdings above which pastoralists in southern Ethiopia can enjoy a more opportunistic form of 
pastoralism and are robust to moderate adverse shocks. Kinsey et al. (1998) observe that some 
households in their sample from Zimbabwe persistently had no livestock, even while most others 
were able to amass sizeable herds despite periodic drought-related liquidation. We can therefore 
expect another consequence of drought to be increased long-term inequality. Reardon and Taylor 
(1996) find that droughts increase poverty for the poor disproportionately, as they rely more 
heavily on crop income; the resulting liquidation of assets, however, makes them more 
vulnerable to future droughts. 
III. Drought and Coping Strategies in Morocco 
  Periodic drought is a key feature of Moroccan agriculture, and given that 90% of 
agricultural land is not irrigated, it poses the single greatest hazard (Skees, 2001; Swearingen and 
Bencherifa, 2000). Historically, households have adapted to irregular rainfall quantity and timing 
by stockpiling grain and fodder from good years, scattering fields, moving herds in search of 
better forage, planting late crops such as lentils (after late rains), and liquidating animals to a 
minimum reproductive herd that requires less fodder (Swearingen and Bencherifa). Additionally, 
                                                 
1 In a unique theoretical study, Elbers et al. (2007) decompose these two effects.   5
certain general adaptations to aridity, such as the planting of barley
2 and the use of fallow
3, have 
also made households more resilient to droughts in the past (Swearingen and Bencherifa).  
  The last three decades have seen increased volatility in national agricultural income 
(Azzam and Sekkat, 2005). Several factors are to blame, the most obvious among them being a 
permanent change in the general precipitation pattern. Since 1980, Morocco has experienced a 
25% decrease in average rainfall, accompanied by an increase in the frequency and severity of 
droughts (Azzam and Sekkat, 2005; Barakat and Handoufe, 1998; Skees, 2001). Around the 
same period, in an effort to boost production, the Moroccan government raised its fixed producer 
price for cereals and other basic food crops from well below- to well above world prices. By the 
mid-1980s, producer prices for barley and wheat were approximately twice world levels 
(Swearingen and Bencherifa, 2000). Predictably, farmers responded with increased production. 
While higher yields played a part in increasing cereal output, another significant part was 
enabled by an expansion in the land under cultivation (Swearingen and Bencherifa, 2000; Azzam 
and Sekkat, 2005). Farmers increased cropland by reducing the acreage left in fallow and by 
encroaching onto low-rainfall grazing lands. The government’s promotion of mechanization 
facilitated this expansion into marginal areas (Swearingen and Bencherifa, 2000). Finally, 
France’s colonial policy of promoting wheat over barley changed Moroccan consumer 
preferences; wheat replaced barley as the predominant native cereal (Swearingen and Bencherifa, 
2000). At the same time that droughts have become more severe, households have abandoned 
many traditions that have helped keep them resilient historically.   
  As traditional adaptations lose their effectiveness, many farmers have developed new 
ones. Swearingen and Bencherifa (2000) report that farmers increasingly use mechanization, 
nitrogen fertilizer, and irrigation to deal with drought. Arguably the single most important 
drought-coping mechanism is mechanized plowing. Mechanized plowing affords greater 
flexibility in both the area planted and the timing of planting, because it can be done far faster 
than animal plowing and does not require that the first rains first soften the soil. Farmers can 
therefore get a better sense of the season to come before breaking the soil. Nitrogen fertilizer is 
also used to increase production during good years so that it may be stockpiled in preparation for 
drought years. And to a lesser extent, households have attempted to develop irrigation systems 
                                                 
2 Barley is more drought tolerant than wheat; it also ripens earlier, reducing the effects of late-
season drought. 
3 Fallow, the practice of leaving a field uncultivated, lets moisture and nutrients  accumulate in 
the soil. This leads to increased yields when the fields are cultivated again. In Morocco, fallowed 
fields also provide a source of fodder for livestock.    6
by digging new wells, diverting surface water onto fields, and using motorized pumps. In sum, 
agriculture has become a higher-risk, higher-stakes game. At the same time, however, 
households are relying less on the farm for income (Swearingen and Bencherifa, 2000) 
IV. Drought-Coping Strategies as a Function of Income Shock and Asset Composition 
  Households mitigate income deficits by reallocating assets. In deciding which asset to 
sell or consume, households weigh the foregone losses in long-term productivity of each. We 
begin with Zimmerman and Carter’s (2003) inter-temporal expected utility maximization 
problem with a productive and non-productive asset. Households receive utility from 
consumption today and expected consumption in the future.  Consumption in any period cannot 
exceed income (I) in that period plus the value of assets drawn down at that time. There are two 
assets: a non-productive asset N and a productive asset P.  is the price of the productive asset 
and the numéraire the price of non-productive asset. This model does not allow borrowing. 
  ct  It + pt + nt         ( 1 )  
Assets evolve such that 
 
Nt+1 = Nt  nt
Pt+1 = Pt  pt
          ( 2 )  
 
Income in every period is a function of the level of the productive asset, the covariate random 
shock parameter t, and a household-specific shock parameter i. 
  Iit =ti fi(Pit)          ( 3 )  
In each period, income is revealed and the household reallocates its resources between 
consumption, savings, and investment. The household’s problem is to choose consumption and 
asset levels in each period to maximize utility today plus the expected sum of all future utility. 
Future utility is discounted by factor . The marginal utility of consumption is decreasing. The 
household is also faced with a subsistence constraint: if consumption falls below a minimum 





















The utility today of all expected future consumption can be expressed as the value of the problem 
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{u(c0)+J*(N1,P 1,L1)}       ( 6 )  
where the state variable L takes the value of 1 as long as consumption in the present period stays 
above the subsistence level.   
  Productive assets can take many forms, and each can have characteristics that tie the 
marginal future productivity of that asset to its level. Intuitively, most assets will have 
diminishing marginal productivity, especially if other co-factors of production are limited. On 
the other hand, too little of an asset can also cause lower productivity. In the case of livestock, 
studies suggest the existence of critical herd size thresholds, below which the marginal 
productivity of an animal falls sharply. Some examples are a span of oxen for plowing 
(Hoddinott (2006)), or a minimum herd size required for transhumant foraging (Lybbert et al. 
2004). Finally, for credit-constrained households, many productive assets can be difficult to 
recoup, especially if doing so requires large sums of capital. Dercon’s (1998) simulation shows 
how the ‘lumpy’ capital requirement for acquiring cattle, combined with credit constraints and 
safety-first behavior can bar some Tanzanian smallholders from entering into the relatively 
remunerative cattle rearing.  
  We consider two extensions to the model above to reflect minimum productive threshold 
effects and investment lumpiness. The first is a minimum productive asset threshold, similar to 
the subsistence constraint. If the productive asset falls below this threshold, it is no longer 
productive. We modify equation 2 such that 
  Iit =
ti fi(Pit)   if Pit > P




        ( 7 )  
where wi <ti fi(Pit). Such a situation could arise if the productive asset is land, and 
landholdings become too small to profitably farm. While income from the asset itself could be 0 
in such a situation, for modeling purposes we keep wi > 0.  
  Next we incorporate a lumpiness constraint proposed by Dercon (1998). Whereas in the 
original problem both productive and non-productive assets were liquid, now only the non-
productive asset is perfectly liquid. Restricting the productive asset to take only integer values 
increases the cost of recouping productive assets after they are consumed. Both modifications   8
can increase the cost of current consumption in terms of future expected productivity, and this 
relationship will depend on the proximity of productive asset levels to critical minimum 
thresholds, and on the level of non-productive assets.  
 
V. Study Area and Data Description 
  In the summer of 2007, and again in 2008, a collaborative team comprising researchers 
from the Moroccan National Institute of Agronomic Research, ICARDA, CIMMYT, and UC 
Davis implemented a survey of wheat-growing households in the Meknes-Tafilalet 
administrative region. The sampled 250 households represented four rural districts: Ain Jemaa, 
Sidi Slimane, Ait Ouikhalféne/Sebt Jahjouh, and Ben Smim. Together, they form an altitudinal 
transect running northwest-southeast through the jurisdiction of the Meknès Regional 
Agricultural Research Center, our Moroccan partner institution. We characterize the four 
districts, respectively, as lowlands (300 to 400 masl), plateau (500 to 600 masl), foothills (700 to 
900 masl), and mountains (1,200 to 1,500 masl). Households in our sample areas depend on 
income from rain-fed annual crops (bread wheat, durum wheat, barley, oats, pulses), livestock, 
wage labor, and remittances. As shown in Table 1, the relative importance of each source differs 
widely between the rural districts, reflecting differences in altitude, terrain, rainfall and 
proximity to urban centers. For example, the districts of Sidi Slimane and Ben Smim are located 
closer to urban centers; in these areas more households report relying on off-farm income 
sources.  
  We designed the surveys with a two-fold objective: to ascertain the relative importance of 
various income sources, and to understand drought as perceived and felt by farmers. Both 2007 
and 2008 surveys included detailed questions about crop production, livestock holdings, fruit and 
olive production, off-farm income sources and remittances from household migrants. The 2007 
survey included a module in which farmers ranked various income sources in terms of risk, and 
then broke down their own household income in terms of the listed income sources. 
Additionally, the 2007 survey was accompanied by a game in which farmers stated their 
willingness to pay for hypothetical wheat varieties with varying yield distributions. The 2008 
survey featured a module in which farmers stated the relative frequencies with which they 
experienced a ‘severe drought’ year, a ‘mild drought’ year, an ‘average’ year, and a ‘good’ year 
and then for each type of year, what wheat yields they could expect.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics by Rural District 
    Ain Jemaa  Sidi Slimane  Sebt Jehjouh  Ben Smim 
Altitude (masl)  300 to 400  500 to 600  700 to 900  1200 to 1500 
Mean Annual Rainfall (mm)  459  425  445  686 
Percent Cultivated Land in         
  bread wheat  47.6  52.7  36.0  24.4 
  durum wheat  5.0  3.3  8.0  10.0 
  oats  1.4  7.8  24.6  18.9 
  barley  10.1  6.0  21.3  32.5 
  faba beans  8.0  0.6  7.7  4.5 
  chick peas  10.4  4.0  0.9  0.7 
  other pulses  1.1  2.5  0.8  6.7 
  sunflower  15.9  .  0.4  . 
  truck crops  0.5  23.2  0.2  2.3 
           
Household demographics             
Mean Cultivated Area (ha)  8.84  2.66  12.24  5.68 
           
Goat Ownership (%)  5.2  0.0  28.4  32.7 
  Mean Goats  9.5  .  31.5  29.5 
           
Sheep Ownership (%)  64.9  39.7  87.7  74.5 
  Mean Sheep  19.5  12.2  74.9  150.7 
           
Cattle Ownership (%)  85.7  79.4  90.1  60.0 
  Mean Cattle  3.5  3.5  4.4  5.3 
           
Reporting Wage Labor (%)  24.6  40.3  17.2  40.0 
Reporting Remittances (%)  16.8  20.9  11.1  7.2 
 
 
VI. Income Sensitivity to Drought 
  The two-year study period coincided with a drought year (2006-2007 crop year), 
followed by a ‘recovery’ year (2007-2008 crop year). Total revenue from the drought year fell 
for most households. Table 2 shows average revenue by income source for each rural district. Of 
the multiple types of income upon which households depend, crop income is arguably the most 
sensitive to drought. We calculate the deficit in crop income from the 2007 harvest using 2008 
crop income as a baseline. By this measure, households in Ain Jemaa were dealt nearly 40% less 
crop income in 2007 than in 2008, and in Sebt Jehjouh, the deficit was approximately 30%. 
Because crops take several months to mature, the harvest outcome is unknown to the farmer at 
the time of planting and the application of most inputs. Unless the farmer’s expectations change, 
cropping choices, inputs, and practices would not change on a yearly basis. Change in crop 
income is therefore a comparatively straightforward measure of the effect of a drought event. In 
addition to crop revenue, Table 2 shows livestock revenue, off-farm income, and remittances for   10
both years. Changes in income from these other sources, however, must be interpreted with 
caution as they can reflect responses to the crop income shock as well as the shock itself. For 
example, 2007-2008 saw significantly higher livestock revenue in all districts except Sebt 
Jehjouh. As will be discussed in the next section, some livestock sales in 2007/2008 were a direct 
result of the drought in 2006/2007. 
 
Table 2.  Mean Gross Income by Source          
   
Ain 
Jemaa  Sidi Slimane  Sebt Jehjouh  Ben Smim 
          
Crop Income   2006/2007  11626  19636  7706  17132 
  2007/2008  25035  29279  12743  19914 
Change in Crop Income    13409  9643  5037  2783 
    (5.36)  (1.20)  (4.07)  (1.29) 
Change as Percentage of     36.86%  -6.37%  31.59%  -0.14% 
2007/2008 Crop Income    (6.41)  (-0.36)  (3.61)  (-0.01) 
           
Off-farm Income  2006/2007  2812  7005  3723  11377 
  2007/2008  4698  8593  581  2097 
Change in Off-farm 
Income    1886  1588  -3142  -9280 
    (1.63)  (0.66)  (-1.62)  (-2.03) 
           
Remittance Income  2006/2007  2058  6632  782  857 
  2007/2008  575  4353  1040  1004 
Change in Remittance Income  -1483  -2279  258  147 
    (-1.26)  (-0.78)  (0.58)  (0.50) 
           
Total Income  2006/2007  16496  33274  12210  29366 
  2007/2008  30308  42225  14364  23016 
Change in Total Income    13812  8951  2153  -6350 
   (4.79)  (1.09)  (0.88)  (-1.17) 
Change as Percentage of    27.35%  -102.81%  -8.62%  -109.05% 
Total 2007/2008 Income    (2.32)  (-1.26)  (-0.29)  (-1.66) 
          
Observations    59  34  50  28 
t-statistics given in parentheses        
 
 
  Households rely on multiple activities and differ in the extent to which they rely on each. 
The short study period, however, precludes the estimation of the relative importance of the 
various activities. We therefore employ the results of the 2007 survey module in which farmers 
state the degree of risk that they associate with cereal income, non-cereal crop income, revenue 
from olives and fruit, livestock sales, and non-agricultural income, and then indicate the   11
percentage contribution of each to total household income in an ‘average’ year. A risk rating of 1 
indicates that the farmer considers the activity ‘very risky’ and 4 indicates that the farmer 
associates no risk whatsoever with the activity. By weighing the risk ratings given to each 
category by the relative importance of each, we generate for each household a stated total income 
risk index. Table 3 summarizes households’ responses by district. Farmers’ subjective responses 
show that agricultural activities, particularly cereal crops, are the most risky (district means 
range from 1.24 to 1.62) and that non-agricultural income is the least risky (district means range 
from 3.28 to 3.77). The responses are consistent with the assumption that drought poses the most 
significant hazard to rural incomes.  
 
Table 3. Perceived Risk and Contribution of Income Categories by District 
   Sidi Slimane  Ain Jemaa  Sebt Jehjouh  Ben Smim 
Cereal Crops  perceived risk  1.58 1.42  1.24 1.62 
  contribution (%)  32 46  39 18 
          
Non-cereal Crops  perceived risk  2.35 1.97  1.73 2.09 
  contribution (%)  19 24  11 12 
          
Olives/Orchards  perceived risk  3.03 2.75  2.37 1.89 
  contribution (%)  13 6  5 9 
          
Livestock  perceived risk  2.64 2.42  2.21 2.20 
  contribution (%)  23 20  43 47 
          
Non-agricultural  perceived risk  3.33 3.77  3.36 3.28 
  contribution (%)  12 4  3  14 
          
Total Income  perceived risk  2.37 1.95  1.84 2.15 
          
N     66 77  80 54 
 
 
  This module also illustrates the wide variation in income composition among the sampled 
households. At the district level, households in Ain Jemaa and Sebt Jehjouh rely the most on 
cereal income, and in Ben Smim, livestock is stated as the single most important income source. 
Households in Sidi Slimane and Ben Smim derive a non-trivial portion of income from non-
agricultural labor. Within each district, the coefficient of variation on the stated income 
contribution ranges across the four districts from .42 to .96 for cereals, .66 to 1.75 for non 
cereals, 1.39 to 2.16 for olives/orchards, .57 to 1.01 for livestock, and 1.70 to 3.13 for non-  12
agricultural income. Meanwhile, the coefficients of variation for perceived risk for all categories 
within each district stay in the range of .15 to .43.    
 
VII. Drought Coping Strategies   
  The 2008 survey presented each farmer with a list of common drought coping 
mechanisms and asked if he had had to rely on any as a direct result of the 2006-2007 drought. 
The list began with reversible, ‘lower-cost’ responses such as drawing down stores of cereals, 
and ended with drastic responses that would have indicated desperation on the part of households 
[Table 4]. The most commonly reported drought responses are drawing down stores of 
agricultural products, selling sheep, selling cattle, beginning or increasing off-farm work, and 
informal loans. 
  
Table 4. Reported Drought Responses       
Percentage of households responding 'yes' to having... 
  Sold more stored production than usual  4.0  
  Consumed more stored  production than usual  16.3  
  Sold more feeder sheep than usual  27.9 * 
  Sold more feeder goats than usual  2.6 * 
  Sold more feeder cattle than usual  9.5 * 
  Sold more reproductive sheep than usual  16.3 * 
  Sold more reproductive goats than usual  5.1 * 
  Sold more reproductive cattle than usual  12.4 * 
  Sold gold  0.4  
  Sold household goods  1.2  
  Began or increased off-farm agricultural work  10.2  
  Began or increased non-agricultural work  8.6  
  Borrowed money from family or friends  19.1  
  Asked for money from family or friends  4.3  
  Borrowed money from someone else  2.7  
  Installed irrigation  2.4  
  Sharecropped in a plot  9.4  
  Sharecropped out a plot  3.1  
  Rented in a plot  9.8  
  Rented out a plot  3.9  
   Sold a parcel  0.0    
*percentages taken over households owning sheep (goats, or cattle)    
 
  Households typically report employing multiple responses. We use Principal Components 
Analysis over the pooled sample to identify the responses that are most commonly observed 
together. This allows the characterization of households not in terms of individual responses, but 
in terms of strategies [Table 5]. Strategy 1 entails the drawing down of stored grain and the sale   13
of sheep or goats. Strategy 2 is a combination of seeking or increasing off-farm work and 
borrowing money. Strategy 3 comprises selling off cattle and renting out land. Strategy 4 also 
involves selling off cattle, but households avoid renting out land.  
 
Table 5.  Commonly Observed Coping Strategies       
  Strategy 1  Strategy 2  Strategy 3  Strategy 4 
Sell/Use Stored Grain (Dh.)  0.61 -0.19  0.25  -0.08 
Small Stock Sales (Dh.)  0.66 -0.05  0.17  -0.06 
Off-Farm Earnings (Dh.)  -0.06 0.72  0.01  0.06 
Take Out Loan (Dh.)  0.33 0.61  0.07  0.29 
Large Stock Sales (Dh.)  -0.21 -0.18  0.67  0.68 
Rent Out Land (ha)  -0.22 0.19  0.68  -0.66 
      
Eigenvalue  1.41 1.32  1.01  0.94 
       
Coping Strategy Correlates             
  Strategy 1  Strategy 2  Strategy 3  Strategy 4 
Small Stock  0.25 -0.02  0.01  -0.12 
Large Stock  0.06 0.06  0.16  -0.18 
Land  0.24 -0.18  -0.04  -0.03 
Labor  0.09 0.06  0.05  0.03 
Non-Agricultural Wealth  0.05 0.06  0.11  0.11 
       
% Income Deficit  0.03 -0.05  -0.02  0.03 
Income Deficit  0.09 -0.05  0.06  0.00 
Stated Total Income Risk  -0.07 0.03  -0.01  -0.06 
 
  The pattern of clustering in the reported drought responses could imply a set sequence of 
actions that all households may take depending on their level of desperation as suggested by 
Corbett (1988). However, it could also indicate the existence of distinct households ‘types.’ 
Strategies 1 and 5 involve the sale or consumption of stored grain and/or small stock, both of 
which may be thought of as non-productive assets. Strategies 3 and 4 involve the sale of cattle 
and/or the renting out of land, strategies that may be more costly in terms of longer-term 
productivity. Strategy 2 describes a response in which household borrow money and seek work 
off-farm. This strategy could indicate a paucity of on-farm assets to sell or consume.  
  The bottom half of Table 5 shows the correlations between each household’s five 
predicted strategy scores and some basic asset indices. Small stock aggregates reported sheep and 
goat numbers, and large stock gives the reported head of cattle
4. Land is the total area, in 
                                                 
4 We use herd sizes reported in the 2007 survey so that the numbers do not yet reflect responses 
to the harvest deficit.    14
hectares, that households reported owning; and labor counts the number of men of age between 
15 and 55 in each household. Unsurprisingly, households with a high score for strategy 1 (sell 
small stock, sell/consume stored grain) are those with more sheep or goats and land. Scores for 
strategy 2 (borrowing money, seeking off-farm work) are negatively correlated with land 
ownership. Households scoring high for strategy 3 (sell large stock, rent out land) appear to be 
those with larger herds of cattle. Strategy 4 (sell large stock, do not rent out land), however, 
shows an equally negative correlation with cattle ownership.   
  A priori we expect to see ‘higher-cost’ strategies associated with larger income deficits. 
We use three measures of the drought shock: the value of each household’s 2008 harvest minus 
the value of its 2007 harvest (Income Deficit), the deficit as a percentage of the 2008 harvest 
value (% Income Deficit), and each household’s stated measure of income risk (where 1=very 
risky and 4=no risk at all). Weak correlations between coping strategies and measure of the 
drought shock do not allow any inference in this respect. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
  This study uses a combination of estimated and stated measures of income sensitivity to 
drought to identify households whose income streams are most exposed. Consistent with 
conventional wisdom, farmers who rely the most on crop income are the ones with the greatest 
income deficits. Cursory analysis of coping strategies shows that households that rely on distress 
sales are those with larger herds, and that seeking loans and off-farm work are the responses of 
those households with little land. The identification of vulnerable households, however, requires 
deeper analysis since the same households that are the most exposed to drought may also be 









                                                                                                                                                            
   15
References 
 
Azzam, A., and K. Sekkat. "Measuring Total-Factor Agricultural Productivity under Drought 
Conditions: The Case of Morocco." The Journal of North African Studies 10, no. 
1(2005): 19-31. 
Barakat, F., and A. Handoufe. "Approche agroclimatique de la sécheresse agricole au Maroc." 
Sécheresse, no. 9(1998): 201-208. 
Carter, M. "Environment, Technology, and the Social Articulation of Risk in West African 
Agriculture." Economic Development and Cultural Change 45, no. 3(1997): 557-590. 
Corbett, J. "Famine and Household Coping Strategies." World Development 16, no. 9(1988): 
1099-1112. 
Dercon, S., and L. Christiaensen. "Consumption risk, technology adoption and poverty traps: 
evidence from Ethiopia." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4257 (2007). 
Elbers, C., J. W. Gunning, and B. Kinsey. "Growth and Risk:  Methodology and Micro 
Evidence." The World Bank Economic Review 21, no. 1(2007): 1-20. 
Hoddinott, J. "Shocks and their Consequences Across and Within Households in Rural 
Zimbabwe." Journal of Development Studies 42, no. 2(2006): 301-321. 
Kazianga, H., and C. Udry. "Consumption smoothing? Livestock, insurance and drought in rural 
Burkina Faso." Journal of Development Economics, no. 79(2006): 413-446. 
Kinsey, B., K. Burger, and J. W. Gunning. "Coping with Drought in Zimbabwe:  Survey 
Evidence on Responses of Rural Households to Risk." World Development 26, no. 
1(1998): 89-110. 
Lybbert, T. J., et al. "Stochastic Wealth Dynamics and Risk Management Among a Poor 
Population." The Economic Journal 114(2004): 750-777. 
Morduch, J. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, no. 3(1995): 103-114. 
Reardon, T., and J. E. Taylor. "Agroclimatic Shock, Income Inequality, and Poverty: Evidence 
from Burkina Faso." World Development 24, no. 5(1996): 901-914. 
Rosenzweig, M. R., and H. P. Binswanger. "Wealth, Weather Risk and the Composition and 
Profitability of Agricultural Investments." The Economic Journal 103, no. 416(1993): 56-
78. 
Skees, J., et al. "Developing Rainfall-Based index Insurance in Morocco." World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2577 (2001). 
Swearingen, W. D., and A. Bencherifa (2000) An Assessment of the Drought Hazard in 
Morocco, ed. D. A. Wilhite, vol. 1. New York, Routledge, pp. 279-286. 
Zimmerman, F., and M. Carter. "Asset smoothing, consumption smoothing and the reproduction 
of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints." Journal of Development Economics, 
no. 71(2003): 233-260. 
 
 